

XENOPHON'S DEVELOPING HISTORIOGRAPHY

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The disparity between the first (*Hell.* 1–2.3.10) and second (*Hell.* 3–7) sections of Xenophon's *Hellenica*¹ has given rise to a variety of explanations. One suggestion concerns itself with the date of writing of section one—either very early or very late.² Another view accounts for the variation in Xenophon's treatment of historical events by pointing to different sources for the two sections.³ The most popular solution has been that Xenophon wrote the first part under the influence

¹ L. Breitenbach, *Xenophons Hellenika* 1 (Berlin 1884) 8–13, emphasized the contrasts in the content of the two sections. Malcolm MacLaren, Jr. "On the Composition of Xenophon's *Hellenica*," *AJP* 55 (1934) 121–39 and 249–62, conveniently summarizes in tabular form the obvious stylistic differences between the two sections. L. Whibley, *A Companion to Greek Studies* (Cambridge 1905) 126, and H. R. Breitenbach, *Xenophon von Athen* (Stuttgart 1966) 1656–1701, divide the second section again at 5.1 while E. Schwartz, "Quellenuntersuchungen zur griechischen Geschichte," *RhM* 44 (1889) 104–26 and 161–93, favouring a unitarian view, considered the difference in the *Hellenica* the result of Xenophon's style developing as he wrote and of his varying interest dependent on whether he was personally involved or not. The section dealing with the tyranny of the Thirty and the reestablishing of the democracy is generally viewed as a link between the two sections although W. P. Henry, *Greek Historical Writing* (Chicago 1966) 14, looks on Book 1 and the whole of Book 2 as the first section.

² H. Richards, "The Hellenics of Xenophon," *CR* 15 (1901) 197–203, thinks that in style section one of the *Hellenica* resembles only the *Cynegeticus* among Xenophon's other work and he considers both early Xenophontean writing. E. Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (Paris 1957) 35–40, favors an early date. F. E. Adcock, *Thucydides and his History* (Cambridge 1963) 99–100, relying heavily on Delebecque, dated the first section of the *Hellenica* before 401 B.C. H. R. Breitenbach, *Xenophon* 1673–74, in trying to establish Xenophon's independent ("von Thukydides unabhängigen") historical interest, suggests, "Xenophon habe die Lücke, die zwischen dem Beginn seiner 'eigentlichen' Hellenika (Buch III) und dem Ende des thukydideischen Werkes vorhanden war, nachträglich geschlossen" (in other words, a late date).

³ A. Banderet, *Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Hellenika* (Basel 1919), finds basically Spartan sources for the latter portion of the *Hellenica*. H. R. Breitenbach, *Xenophon* 1680, proposes an Athenian source for the first section.

of Thucydidean notes or criteria.⁴ As a part of the attempt of the past two decades to establish Xenophon's independent historical interest and outlook the view has recently been put forth that there is absolutely no connection between the *Hellenica* and the history of Thucydides. Although one can sympathize with this suggestion in view of the vast amount of speculation concerning Xenophon's *Hellenica* one should not hesitate to see the influence of Thucydides in some part of Xenophon's work (if it exists) since this need not be a disparagement of the author but may well show his good sense. This paper, therefore, will attempt to establish, first, that Xenophon, in his early career as a historian, used criteria that seem to resemble those of Thucydides and, second, that the marked stylistic difference between the two sections of the *Hellenica* is accompanied by an increasingly independent perspective.

In this undertaking it is logical to look at what Xenophon himself has to say about historical writing. The first passage in which he indicates criteria for determining historical subject-matter reads as follows:

καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀποφθέγματα οὐκ ἀξιόλογα, ἐκείνο δὲ κρίνω τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαστόν, τὸ τοῦ θανάτου παρεστηκότος μήτε τὸ φρόνιμον μήτε τὸ παιγνιώδες ἀπολιπεῖν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς.⁵

The words *ταῦτα ἀποφθέγματα* refer to the account of the behavior of Theramenes at his death. Xenophon's apologetic comment is that "these remarks" are not noteworthy (*ἀξιόλογα*). Thus he implies that there are some established criteria for historical writing to which he still adheres in part. In using *μὲν* and *δέ* he further indicates that

⁴ Delebecque (above, note 2) 40–70 is the latest in a long series of scholars (all carefully listed by Henry [above, note 1] 54–88) who favour the theory of Thucydidean notes or papers as the basis of the first part of Xenophon's *Hellenica*. L. Brietenbach (above, note 1) 28, 56–69 rejected as insufficient the explanation that section one represents the remnants of Thucydidean notes. But he postulated (32–63) that Xenophon attempted to complete Thucydides' history by gathering notes and memoranda in their annalistic order. After he returned from Asia he again took up the writing of the work and died before he could revise and complete the first section. The entire work was published under one title by someone else. Although he is somewhat harshly attacked by Henry, I think there is much that is sensible in this view.

⁵ Xenophon, *Hellenica*, edited by E. C. Marchant (Oxford 1900) 2.3.56. Ivo Bruns, *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen* (reprinted Hildesheim 1961) 37, thinks that Xenophon is apologizing that this passage is "stilwidrig" and that this is proof that he was attempting to write in the Thucydidean manner.

there exists in his mind a tension between his established criteria (that he has used up to this point) and a natural inclination within himself.⁶

The second passage in which Xenophon discusses how he is writing his history is found between the accounts of land-warfare from 394 to 388 and naval operations during the same period.

ἐν ᾧ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπράττετο, τὰ κατὰ θάλατταν αὖ καὶ τὰς πρὸς θαλάττῃ πόλεις γενόμενα διηγέσσομαι, καὶ τῶν πράξεων τὰς μὲν ἀξιωμασιμονεύτους γράψω, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀξίας λόγου παρήσω (Hell. 4.8.1).

At first glance he seems to be reaffirming that he is committed to choosing incidents that are noteworthy (τὰς ἀξιωμασιμονεύτους, τὰς μὴ ἀξίας λόγου) in some generally accepted sense. On the other hand, that he finds it necessary to interrupt a narrative in order to state what sort of subject-matter he will choose in the following account may indicate that he is conscious of not always having used the same criteria in what has preceded this statement. In other words, Xenophon has perhaps already selected events from outside the generally accepted realm of historical material.⁷

The next passage that we shall consider sheds further light on what these criteria might be. Xenophon ends his account of Teleutias' departure from the soldiers as follows:

γινώσκω μὲν οὖν ὅτι ἐν τούτοις οὔτε δαπάνημα οὔτε κίνδυνον οὔτε μηχανήματα ἀξιόλογον οὐδὲν διηγούμαι· ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τόδε ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀνδρὶ ἐννοεῖν, τί ποτε ποιῶν ὁ Τελευτίας οὕτω διέθηκε τοὺς ἀρχομένους. τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη πολλῶν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ κινδύνων ἀξιολογώτατον ἀνδρὸς ἔργον ἐστίν.⁸

⁶ Hell. 1.1.27-31 is one passage in the early part of the work in which Xenophon displays a special interest in an individual (Hermocrates of Syracuse). L. Breitenbach (above, note 1) thought that this passage had been inserted into this context at a later date after Xenophon had returned from Asia and the Hellespont where he had investigated these events. Henry (above, note 1) 27, 28 in pointing out the similarity between this account and Teleutias' relationship to the troops in Hell. 5.1.3 and 13-18 unintentionally gives some support to this view since the similarity may be the result of composing these passages within a short interval of each other. On the other hand, I prefer to see such passages in the early part of the work as expressions of an inclination which becomes predominant later in the *Hellenica* when Xenophon has consciously developed his own criteria for historical narrative.

⁷ E.g., the account of Agesilaus' training methods for his soldiers (Hell. 2.4.16-19).

⁸ Hell. 5.1.4. Marchant retains the superlative ἀξιολογώτατον although several other editors follow Dindorf in emending it to the comparative form. Bruns (above,

This quotation is important to our argument because it is a clear example of Xenophon's conscious consideration (*τόδε ἄξιόν μοι δοκεῖ*) of what, at this point, he has included in his history. Here it becomes quite plain that according to usual criteria the noteworthy subjects in history are great expenditure (*δαπάνημα*), danger (*κίνδυνος*) and strategy (*μηχάνημα*). Furthermore, Xenophon candidly records his growing dissatisfaction with these established criteria through the use of the superlative *ἀξιολογώτατον*.

The last passage to be considered adds one further detail. Xenophon writes:

ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν μὲν μεγάλων πόλεων, εἴ τι καλὸν ἔπραξαν, ἅπαντες οἱ συγγραφεῖς μέμνηται· ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴ τις μικρὰ πόλις οὖσα πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα διαπέπρακται, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἄξιον εἶναι ἀποφαίνειν (Hell. 7.2.1).

This was written after 366, for it serves as an introduction to an account of the activities of the people of Phlius. Here it becomes evident that according to these criteria, approved by *ἅπαντες οἱ συγγραφεῖς*, the usual participants in a history are great cities. Here, also, Xenophon declares that his present topic is a still more worthy (*ἔτι μᾶλλον ἄξιον*) subject for historical writing than that of other authors. In direct contradiction, he has chosen a small state as the subject of his narrative. In two of the passages we have already discussed (Hell. 2.3.56; 5.1.4) he links the word *ἀξιόλογον* with the actions of an individual rather than with those of a great state. This as we can now see is the motivation for the apologetic nature of the passages. We can now conclude from our investigation that for Xenophon the concept of what was noteworthy had governed his choice of historical material and that as he interpreted this concept for himself he was gradually forced to oppose the traditional selection of subject-matter—namely, great states making great expenditures, enduring great dangers and inventing new strategy.

Where did this concept of noteworthiness come from? H. R. Breitenbach in discussing the passages quoted above asserts that the use of the word *ἀξιόλογον* is part of the tradition of historiography note 6) 38 already attempted to link these words with Thucydidean methods but has been opposed by Henry (above, note 1) 29, note 62 who simply refuses to accept this passage as "testimony for the existence of any such laws in Xenophon's composition."

established by Herodotus and Thucydides. He also traces the occurrence of *δαπανήματα* and *κίνδυνοι* back through Thucydides, Herodotus and Pindar to the "Adelsgesellschaft." On the other hand, he finds that Xenophon brings his own peculiar meaning to the word *μηχανήματα* in that he links it with the behavior of the outstanding or exemplary individual.⁹ In studying these words individually he has, however, overlooked the fact that, according to the historiographical tradition as Xenophon understands it, *δαπανήματα*, *κίνδυνοι* and *μηχανήματα* of great states are the essence of *τὰ ἀξιόλογα*. The interrelationship of the concepts embodied in these words was not developed by Xenophon, who expresses his increasing dissociation¹⁰ from the general application of these precepts to history, but by someone who had preceded him in the writing of history.

Who first among extant Greek historians consciously linked the historically noteworthy with the expenditures, dangers and varying strategy of powerful states? In the opening chapters of Thucydides¹¹ we see this association of ideas in its rudimentary form:

He began (writing) immediately at the outset in the belief that it would be a great war and the most noteworthy (*ἀξιολογώτατον*) of those that had taken place. He inferred this on the grounds that both sides went into it at the height of their power and prepared in every way, and because he saw the rest of the Greek states aligning themselves with one side or the other; some immediately, others intending to. For this was

⁹ H. R. Breitenbach, *Historiographische Anschauungsformen Xenophons* (Freiburg 1950) 17-23, discusses *ἀξιόλογον*; 47-57, *δαπανήματα* and *κίνδυνοι*; and 57-59, *μηχανήματα*. I am much indebted to this study.

¹⁰ H. R. Breitenbach, *Anschauungsformen* 19, because he overemphasizes the apologetic nature of the passages under discussion, does not notice that Xenophon becomes more explicitly independent as he proceeds with his work.

¹¹ Thucydides, *Historia*, edited by H. S. Jones and J. E. Powell (Oxford 1942) 1.1.1 and 2; 23.1. Herodotus, *Historiae*, edited by C. Hude (Oxford 1927) uses the words *ἄξιον λόγου* or *ἀξιαπήγητος* six times according to J. E. Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* (reprinted Hildesheim 1960) 31, but, except in two places, he applies them to physical objects such as temples. In 1.177 he says that he is going to describe some tribes in Northern Mesopotamia who caused Cyrus the most trouble (*πλεῖστον πόνον*) and are the most notable (*ἀξιαπήγητότατα*). In 8.91 he simply tells us that the Aeginetans achieved deeds worthy of note (*ἔργα ἀπεδέξαντο λόγου ἄξια*). In 1.5 Herodotus says that he will mention an individual who has harmed the Greeks (*τὸν ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας*) and will present small and great cities alike (*ὁμοίως μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστυ ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξιὼν*). Therefore the subject-matter would be more akin to the events Xenophon finds "more worthy," *Hell.* 7.2.1.

the greatest movement among the Hellenes and some part of the barbarians and, so to speak, among the majority of mankind.

Again we read:

The length of this war was greatly protracted and in it sufferings came to befall Greece like no others in an equal amount of time.

The ideas that recur are remarkably familiar.¹² The work is to be the historical narrative of a war that is the most noteworthy of all that have taken place. This is why the author undertook to recount what happened. What makes the events noteworthy in the eyes of the author is that both cities at the height of their power (*ἀκμάζοντες*) entered a war that was very long, brought great sufferings into Greece and involved a great part of mankind (indirectly, then, great expenditures, great dangers and much strategy; cf. Thuc. 1.18.3).

Perhaps we may now draw some tentative conclusions. First, Thucydides had originally established that the political and economic behavior of great states (or large sections of the human race) under the stress of danger was the best subject-matter for history. By 365 this had become a generally accepted canon for historiography. Second, Xenophon implies that originally he concurred with this rule and sought to follow it when he began to present historical events. Third, as he developed his own concept of *τὸ ἀξιόλογον* he gradually became more fascinated by the remarkable behavior of individuals and small states in contrast to the accepted canon.¹³ To verify our conclusions let us look in a little more detail at the *Hellenica* itself.

In section one there is but one incident that involves a speech of major proportions. It is found approximately in the center of the section and, because of the amount of space Xenophon devotes to it,

¹² The notion of the greatness of the theme is, of course, conventional in Greek literature. What concerns us is that Thucydides' theme is great because it involves and confines itself to the activities of two great states. That Xenophon does not give us a conventional statement at the beginning of the *Hellenica* concerning the greatness of his theme has been interpreted by some scholars as an acknowledgment that the theme with which he begins the work is, in fact, that of someone else.

¹³ To say that Xenophon wrote under the influence of Thucydides does not necessarily mean that the *Hellenica* is a "formal attempt" to complete Thucydides' history. If my conclusions are correct, I find it unlikely that Xenophon wrote the first section at the end of his life when he had, in fact, moved further away from Thucydides' historical precepts.

assumes an importance far surpassing any other event. It is the battle of Arginusae (*Hell.* 1.6.15-7.35). Xenophon sets the scene very carefully. The news that the Athenian fleet is blockaded by Calli-crattidas in the harbor of Mytilene is brought to Athens. The danger and cost of the measures taken by the Athenians are emphasized in that the one hundred and ten ships are manned by every individual who can fight available to the state (1.6.24: *τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὄντας ἅπαντας καὶ δούλους καὶ ἐλευθέρους*). Even some of the Knights are put aboard. This, then, is regarded by the Athenians as no ordinary mission but one of great danger and importance. The last resources that remain to the imperial city after so many years of war are amassed for the battle. They also make a special levy of ships and men from their allies (*εἰσβαίνειν ἀναγκάσαντες ἅπαντας*). In the ensuing battle the Laconians lose nine out of a total of ten ships and their allies another sixty. Twenty-five ships on the Athenian side are disabled. The importance that is attached to the recovery of these ships is demonstrated by the detail with which Xenophon describes the operation (*Hell.* 1.6.34 and 35). He gives us the names of the captains (Theramenes and Thrasybulus; later he tells us that they had formerly been generals and should therefore have been responsible men), the number of ships assigned to the task (forty-seven), the attitude of the men (*ταῦτα δὲ βουλομένους ποιεῖν*) and the weather (windy and stormy) that prevented the recovery. When the report of the battle is heard in the Athenian assembly, the victorious generals are put on trial for not recovering the twenty-five ships and their crews. The financial strain and the dangerous position in which the Athenians find themselves are leaving their mark.

The struggle for control of the Athenian *dēmos* now becomes the focal point of the narrative. The people are constrained to support the motion of Callixenus by the appearance of men dressed in mourning at the Apaturia and by the emotional appeal of one who alleges that he survived the battle in a meal barrel (1.7.11: *φάσκων ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι*). When it is pointed out that the proposal of Callixenus is unconstitutional (*παράνομον*) the majority of the people shout that it is monstrous if someone should not allow the *dēmos* to do whatever it wishes. The next response of the assembly is described with the words *ἐπεθορύβησε πάλιν ὁ ὄχλος*. The *dēmos* has gradually

degenerated into a mob that will listen to no reason. The emotional impulsiveness that is the result of the long years of war and that motivates the Athenians in their decision-making has drawn Xenophon's attention.

It is at this point that Euryptolemus gives a long speech that reflects upon the situation in which Athens finds herself. The Athenian naval force has won a great victory and there is need now of clear vision and strong united action. Partisan politics must be put aside. This requires above all that the assembly itself act according to the constitution in order to ensure that the best decisions be reached and a future course of action followed that will engender success. In fact, Athens may well have further need of men who have demonstrated their ability in war and this requires that the assembly proceed with the greatest caution. Prudent behaviour in accord with the constitution is precisely what the speaker advocates. Xenophon allows him to end his long oration with these words:

Therefore, oh men of Athens, in return for victory and good fortune may you not do things similar to men who have been defeated and unfortunate, nor in the face of heaven's compulsion may you appear to act without reason by charging with treason instead of helplessness. Surely it would be far more just to crown with garlands the men who were victorious than to punish them with death at the persuasion of wicked men. (1.7.33; I have for the moment omitted the phrase bracketed by E. C. Marchant.)

But then Xenophon informs us by means of indirect statement that Euryptolemus persisted in placing a motion before the assembly that was ultimately defeated and resulted in the generals being unconstitutionally condemned. It is clear that Xenophon wanted to give special emphasis to the quoted words. They impel the reader to interpret the events that have gone before and to characterize the Athenians. This pattern of behaviour that the *dēmos* followed here is characteristic of the whole war. In the face of victory and good fortune the Athenians because of the loss of ships and men (one thinks of *κίνδυνοι* and *χρήματα*) follow policies (*μηχανήματα*) worthy only of men who are beaten and in distress.¹⁴ The Athenians, in other words, lost the

¹⁴ It was Xenophon's disillusionment with the inability of the Athenians to act according to their own laws (*κατὰ νόμον πάντα ποιεῖν*) that made him appreciate the

war because they defeated themselves. This is the theme of section one.¹⁵ That the *dēmos* after the death of the generals had a change of heart only emphasizes that Euryptolemus' analysis of the Athenians' behavior is correct. Thus Xenophon was, in fact, presenting the political and economic behaviour of a state that was great and could have continued so had it followed its own principles. Consideration, then, of the general theme of section one of the *Hellenica* supports our conclusion about Xenophon's early historical criteria.

In section two of the *Hellenica* the account of Iphicrates' expedition to Corcyra (*Hell.* 6.2.1-39) is most indicative of Xenophon's later choice of historical subject-matter. The dispute over the island arises out of an attempt to bring some stability and unity to the Hellenic political situation that miscarries. The short entreaty which the Corcyraeans address to the Athenians emphasizes the basic reasons for the altercation. Xenophon writes:

The Corcyraeans declared that for their part the Athenians would cast away a great good if they should be deprived of Corcyra but they would add great strength to the enemy. For from no other city except Athens would more ships or more money come. Furthermore, Corcyra lay in a favorable position with respect to the Corinthian gulf and the cities which came down to it, in a favorable position to do harm to Laconian territory and in an especially favorable position with respect to the coast of Epirus and the crossing from Sicily to the Peloponnesus (*Hell.* 6.2.9).

The contemplation of such things as the danger from the strength of the enemy, the expenditures that Corcyra can make to the benefit of Athens and the strategic geographical position of the island is already familiar to us. However the rest of the account gives little further consideration to these aspects of the situation. Our attention from this point onward is concentrated on Iphicrates who in contrast to his procrastinating predecessor, Timotheus, and his Spartan rival,

constitution of the Lacedaemonians, which compelled its citizens to behave in accordance with the principles of *ἀρετή* and to obey the laws. Cf. *Resp. Lac.* 10.4-8.

¹⁵ Consider the behavior of the Athenians at Aegospotami, which eventually led to their defeat (*Hell.* 2.1.25, 26). The reaction of the people of Athens to the announcement of the defeat at Aegospotami is a severe self-criticism of the way in which they had conducted the war (*Hell.* 2.2.3, 4).

Mnasippus, brings a sudden stability and sense of purpose both to his men and the Athenian state (14).

Iphicrates' leadership ability is given in some detail. He exercises and trains his men (27 and 30), provides them with competition and a system of rewards and punishments (28), and takes special precautions in placing and guarding his camp in order to make his men aware of their situation (29). While these seem to us to be practical considerations, they are for Xenophon an expression of the foresight that Iphicrates brought to his position (32). The battle with Melanippus, the Rhodian, is introduced to demonstrate that Iphicrates both in training and in inspiring his men had been successful so that victory came with ease (33-35). All this is in sharp contradiction to the policy of Mnasippus who lost the support of his men and his own life because of lack of discipline among his troops (6: *ἔφασαν τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν ὥστ' οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν, εἰ μὴ ἀνθοσμίας εἶη*: cf. 6.2.26), failure to give them their pay (16), and overconfidence (16: *ἐνόμιζέ τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐκαινούργει*). This kind of leadership ends in despondency (19) and defeat. Clearly the development of abstract qualities such as bravery, courage and eagerness which eventually bring political and economic success to a state originate in practical things such as hard work, discipline and reward.

Xenophon writes a final summation of the expedition in which he praises Iphicrates' action in directing the Athenians to elect as his colleagues men who were his political rivals, Callistratus and Chabrias. He gives his reasons as follows:

For if he desired to take them along as counsellors because he thought them intelligent, he seems to have acted wisely. If he considered them antagonistic, and in this way boldly appeared neither forgetful nor neglectful of anything, this seems to me to be characteristic of a man who has great confidence in himself (*Hell.* 6.2.39).

Here also it is a question of judicious foresight. Iphicrates had what seemed a difficult task to perform. Failure might well have placed him in some jeopardy at Athens since the assembly took this expedition very seriously (10, 13). In such a situation he ensures that this expedition will have the best possible leadership as well as the sympathetic

support of the *dêmos*. By a very simple practical means he brings esprit de corps and a sense of unity to the Athenian assembly.

It must, however, be kept in mind that Iphicrates' voyage accomplished nothing, for the situation that he was to correct had already rectified itself before he arrived (15-26). Xenophon is aware of this and nevertheless gives a detailed account of an expedition that affected neither the political nor the economic future of any Greek state. Xenophon's interest in this is based on its exemplary value. This account Peter Krafft¹⁶ finds to be evidence for "die entschiedene paradigmatische Schau der Geschichte." Xenophon has added to the presentation of great cities involved in great events the portrayal of instructive behavior (whether of individuals or small states).¹⁷

One final question remains. What caused Xenophon to change his approach to history? One of the first answers that comes to mind is that he was simply more interested in the behavior of individuals, as soon becomes apparent from a consideration of his other works. Aside from this, however, the decline of Athens and Sparta in the fourth century forced Xenophon to look for other subject-matter. He had seen Athens when it was still a great city and he had witnessed and recorded its decline and defeat. In addition, he had travelled and seen the great cities of the Near East. These were governed by individuals around whom a mystique had developed that could not help but stimulate one whose interests already tended toward the contemplation of the noble individual in the exercise of leadership. In the face of all this the cities of Greece in their weakened state in 365 B.C. had lost their fascination for Xenophon. He indicates as much in the last statement of his summation of the effects of the battle of Mantinea on the Greek states: ἀκρισία δὲ καὶ παραχῇ ἔτι πλείων μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐγένετο ἢ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι (Hell. 7.5.27). If one

¹⁶ P. Krafft, "Vier Beispiele des Xenophontischen in Xenophons Hellenika," *RhM* 110 (1967) 103-50. H. R. Breitenbach, *Anschaungsformen* 29-104, devotes the major portion of his thesis to "Die Einzelperson im Rahmen der Gesamtdarstellung."

¹⁷ The accounts of Dercylidas' leadership in Asia (Hell. 3.2.6-7), Agesilaus' activity at Ephesus (Hell. 3.4.16-19), and Teleutias' relationship to his soldiers (Hell. 5.1.3-4) are further evidence of Xenophon's interest in how one builds unity and esprit de corps in a body of men. However, this is not the only exemplary interest that he displays in the *Hellenica*. The activity of the state of Phlius (Hell. 7.2.1-23) is recounted to emphasize the importance of fulfilling treaties and of brave steadfastness in spite of grave suffering (Hell. 7.3.1).

pursues the idea inherent in the words ἀκρισία and παραχή through Xenophon's works¹⁸ one soon becomes aware that there was nothing he feared and, at the same time, despised more than political tumult and confusion. In his introduction to the *Cyropaedia* he points out that it is as a result of the political instability he has seen that he is presenting what he knows about Cyrus since he surpassed other men in government (1.6.1: τοσοῦτον διήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνθρώπων). Thus for Xenophon good leadership was the basic solution to the political troubles of his day.¹⁹

The words ἔτι πλείων ἢ πρόσθεν make us aware that the situation in Greece even before the battle of Mantinea could be designated ἀκρισία and παραχή. These are not the characteristic qualities of a great state. Is it any wonder, then, that he moved away from the Thucydidean criteria and added "die paradigmatische Schau" to his historiographical precepts? He had the choice either of doing that or of breaking off his account at the end of the Peloponnesian War.

In summary then, as the answer to the basic question of what Xenophon was trying to do in the *Hellenica*, I suggest that he began by recording the decline and fall of a great city and moved from this to an account of the deterioration and disintegration of Hellenic political organization. In so doing he included with increasing frequency material of exemplary value.²⁰ If we recognize this we will not approach the *Hellenica* with the hope of finding what is not there.²¹

¹⁸ *Anab.* 3.1.38; 3.2.29-31; *Resp. Lac.* 10.4-8; *Cyr.* 1.1.1-6; *Oec.* 8.3-10; *Mem.* 3.1.7; *Hipp.* 2.9; *de vect.* 5.7 and 8.

¹⁹ See W. Weathers, "Xenophon's Political Idealism," *CJ* 49 (1953-54) 317-21 and 330. Neal Wood, "Xenophon's Theory of Leadership," *Class. et Med.* 25 (1964) 33-65, established that Xenophon thought that experience as a military leader provided one with the ability and skill to exercise political leadership. G. B. Nussbaum, *The Ten Thousand* (Leiden 1967) 96-146, discusses Xenophon's ideas about leadership as they are exemplified in the *Anabasis*. H. D. Westlake, "Individuals in Xenophon, *Hellenica*," in *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester 1969) 211, sets out to prove that "the limitations of his own experience as a military leader unfitted him to assess the leadership of others." I doubt very much that Xenophon tried to give a full historical assessment of the individuals whom he mentions.

²⁰ Stephen Usher, *The Historians of Greece and Rome* (London 1969) 66-99, using a slightly different method has come to similar conclusions about Xenophon's *Hellenica*.

²¹ I wish to express my thanks to Professors J. E. A. Crake, P. Harding and M. F. McGregor who read and criticized this paper.